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MANDATORY RETIREMENT AND IMPACT DISCRIMINATION
UNDER THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
ACT: YOU'LL GET YOURS WHEN YOU'RE 70
by
MAXINE S. THOMAS*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Since the turn of the century, the number of Americans over 65
years of age has grown two and one half times faster than the population
as a whole ... we, willfully and knowingly waste their resources, their
skills and experiences. We do not grow old merely by living the number
of years. People grow old by losing their enthusiasm, deserting their ideals,
abandoning their joy for life and no longer looking forward to the
challenges of adventure and change. Instead of yearning for retirement,
the desire for a vigorous active life and the wish and ability to work hard
and look forward with hope instead of fear often exists in men and women
for 70 years or more .... Years may wrinkle the skin but to abandon
enthusiasm wrinkles the soul and deadens the brain."'
N APRIL OF 1978, Congress amended the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act2 (ADEA) to protect workers up to the age of seventy3 and to prohibit
mandatory retirement prior thereto when based on age.' The amendment
responded directly to the Supreme Court's decision in United Airlines, Inc.
v. McMann5 wherein the Supreme Court concluded that a pre-sixty-five in-
voluntary retirement plan was allowable if part of a bona fide seniority system
or benefit plan and not used as a subterfuge of the Act.' Chief Justice Burger
writing on behalf of the majority stated that a seniority or benefit plan adopted
prior to the effective date of the ADEA was, by definition, not a subterfuge
of the Act even though that plan required involuntary retirement of employees
prior to age sixty-five.'
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law; B.A., J.D., University of Washington.
'113 CONG. REC. 31,256 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Young).
'Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (1978).
'29 U.S.C. § 631 (1978).
'29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1978).
'434 U.S. 192 (1977).
Vid. at 203.
'Id.
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Congress, in Public Law 95-256, explicitly declared its intolerance of in-
voluntary retirement of protected workers based upon age under the ADEA's
bona fide seniority system or benefit plan defense.8
While the McMann decision was the catalyst for the 1978 amendment,
the determination that age was not an allowable basis for involuntary retire-
ment was not a new concept. The Secretary of Labor in his 1975 annual report
on the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 had specifically con-
cluded that pre-sixty-five involuntary retirements were unlawful unless required
by the terms of an otherwise bona fide seniority system or benefit plan. 9 Several
circuit courts had addressed issues similar to those raised in McMann and con-
cluded that a pre-sixty-five involuntary retirement plan violated the Act
regardless of whether the plan pre-dated the Act."0
Congress and the courts, however, have been inconsistent in their treat-
ment of age discrimination. They have not been able to reconcile differences
in their tolerance of some types of age discrimination and intolerance of others.
Congress has been quick to disallow negative age discrimination but slow to
proscribe ameliorative age discrimination."I Even within the ADEA, Congress
has been inconsistent in its tolerance of age discrimination in employment. Man-
datory pre-seventy retirement is now illegal under the ADEA, but different
seniority and retirement benefits are not.' 2 The allowance of these differences
for older workers is not only inconsistent, it also violates the spirit of the Act.
Courts, following Congress' uncertainty in the area, have analyzed age
discrimination using either disparate treatment' 3 analysis or disparate impact
'29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1978). [Note also that the Act, as amended in 1978, protects workers up to age
70. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1978)].
'DEPT. OF LABOR ON ACTIVITIES UNDER THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT, at 17 (1975).
"Zinger v. Blanchett, 549 F.2d 901 (3d Cir. 1977) cert., denied 434 U.S. 1008 (1978); McMann v. United
Airlines, 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
"For example, Americans over the age of 55 may exclude up to $125,000 of gain on the sale of their personal
residence. Others may only defer gain if the personal residence is replaced with a more expensive residence
within a specified period of time.
See Congressional Reports which accompanied the original Act citing concerns about no longer needing
the family home and the need to use the gained money to meet living expenses. Pub. L. No. 88-272 (1964)
H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong. 2d Sess. (1964); reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1313;
S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong. 2d Sess (1964); reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1313, 1673,
S. SuPP. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong. 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1313,
1868, CONG. REP. No. 1149, 88th Cong. 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1313, 1940.
12 (f) "It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization ...
(2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employee benefit
plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade
the purposes of this chapter, except that no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the
failure to hire any individual, and no such seniority system or employee benefit plan shall
require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual specified by Section 631 (a)
of this title because of the age of such individual;
29 § 623(0(2) as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-256 § 2(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978). But under a 1982 amendment
to the Act, employers can no longer offer different health benefits to employees aged sixty-five to sixty-
nine. Pub. L. 97-248, § 116(a) (1982).
'Disparate treatment refers to intentional discrimination. It requires proof of a subjective motive or intent.
See generally, Player, "Proof of Disparate Treatment Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act:
[Vol. 17:1AKRON LAW REVIEW
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analysis.'" This article will consider disparate impact analysis in the context
of mandatory retirement of the pre-seventy employee under the ADEA. While
disparate treatment analysis is clearly appropriate under the current legislative
scheme, disparate impact analysis should also be available in age discrimina-
tion cases which consider mandatory retirement.
While it has been argued that Congress did not intend to confer disparate
impact analysis on the ADEA, it must be remembered that the analysis is court-
created. Congress did not "intend" to confer disparate impact analysis on Title
VII either. But the effect of impact discrimination on those from forty to seventy
is no different than the effect of impact discrimination on individuals because
of their race or gender. There is no logical reason why the disparate impact
analysis should not be used in age discrimination cases as well, except that Con-
gress has created a separate statute for age discrimination. Once the protected
class has been identified, however, nothing in the nature or extent of the
discrimination supports the difference in analysis of age discrimination as op-
posed to sex and race discrimination. Congress, in its creation of a separate
statute, has not created a barrier to the realization of freedom from discrimina-
tion for the protected class of workers aged forty to seventy. This article con-
cludes that impact discrimination under the ADEA should be treated and analyz-
ed as is impact discrimination under Title VII.
II. AGEISM
Ageism is the process of stereotyping based on the number of years an
individual has lived. I5 It includes both generalizations about capabilities or the
lack thereof as well as the granting or denying of rights or benefits due to one's
age.
Age has traditionally been a major determinant of entitlement to benefits
during both the first and last parts of one's life.' 6 Most states, for example,
have laws that determine when an individual may commence attendance in state
public schools, or when an individual may receive special utility or tax rates. 7
These requirements rely on age. Age is thus used as a measure of the likely
characteristics of an individual. This use, however, ignores individual differences.
Variations on a Title VII Theme," 17 GA. L. REV. 621 (1983.
"Disparate impact refers to neutral policies or acts which have the unintentional effect of discrimination.
See footnote 27, infra and text and footnotes accompanying section V., B., infra. O'Connell v. Ford Motor
Co., 11 Fair Empl. Proc. Cas. (BNA) 1471, 1472 (E.D. Michigan 1975) (Because prohibitions of A.D.E.A.,
with few minor exceptions, are identical to those of Title VII, standards developed under Title VII may
be adapted to A.D.E.A. cases, with the substitution of "age" for "race").
"R. BUTLER, The Process of Systemic Stereotyping of and Discrimination Against People Because They
Are Old, in WHY SURVIVE? BEING OLD IN AMERICA, 12 (1975).
"Birren and Loucks, Age Related Change and the Individual 57 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 833, (hereinafter
cited as Birren and Loucks).
'See HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY TO THE ELDERLY, H.R. Doc. No. 167, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1978) which lists over 40 major federal programs which give special benefits to the
elderly.
Summer, 19831
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It can easily be appreciated that an individual has both a biological'8 and
psychological 9 age. An individual's biological and psychological age may not
coincide. Chronological" age and competency, in particular here the ability
to physically or mentally perform on the job, similarly may not coincide.
The question, then, is whether an age-based statutory classification is a
lawful index of one's ability to perform a job. This inquiry must start with
a consideration of Congress' intent in proscribing age discrimination in employ-
ment as set forth in the ADEA.
III. HISTORY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ADEA
Congress considered incorporating a ban on age discrimination in Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Many Congressmen, however, perceived
a qualitative difference between age discrimination and sex and race
discrimination.2 Sorhe legislators felt age discrimination was a severe and
obvious problem. Others were unsure. Still others felt it was necessary to docu-
ment the need for legislation.22 The Secretary of Labor was directed to report
to Congress on age discrimination in employment, which he did in 1965.23 The
report showed that a substantial amount of age discrimination in employment
did exist; therefore, in 1967 the ADEA was enacted.24
The significance of the fact that age was placed in a separate act from
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been debated by commentators.25 Many have
considered this an indication of Congress' intent that age and race or sex
discrimination be treated completely differently, that the nature of the
discrimination was sufficiently different to warrant different analyses, treatments
and statutes.26 Others have viewed the parallels between the two acts as an indica-
tion that Congress perceived that age based discrimination was similar to race
and sex discrimination and should be similarly treated.27
""Biological age refers to the individual's present position with respect to his potential lifespan." Birren
and Loucks, supra note 16, at 839.
"Psychological age refers to one's "statue in comparison with the average capacities of persons of the
same chronological age" Id. at 840.
2 Chronological age refers to the number of years one has lived.
"Even during Congressional debate on the ADEA Congressmen raised such concerns. For example
Representative Burke stated:
Age discrimination is not the same as the insidious discrimination based on race or creed prejudices
and bigotry. These discriminations result in nonemployment because of feelings about a person
entirely unrelated to his ability to do a job. This is hardly a problem for the older job seeker.
Discrimination arises for him because of assumptions that are made about the effects of age on
performance. 113 CONG. REC. 34,743 (1967).
22/d.
11113 CONG. REC. 31,254 (1967).
'Age Discrimination in Employment Act. ch. 14 §§ 621-634, 81 Stat. 602 (1967).
"See Note, Age Discrimination and the Disparate Impact Doctrine 34 STAN. L. REV. 837 (1982).
"Id. at 849-854.
"Cf Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980) where the court applied Title VII's disparate impact
test to an ADEA case. See also, Player and Deming, Defenses Under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act: Misinterpretation, Misdirection, and the Amendments 12 GA. L. REV. 4, 747 (1978).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:1
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The ADEA was enacted when Title VII was only two years old. None
of the landmark decisions had yet been haded down which shaped the parameters
of Title VII. Congress, then, was unsure of the actual effect of Title VII on
the elimination of sex and race discrimination.28
It is not surprising that the ADEA actually does parallel Title VII. It was
enacted pursuant to the Secretary of Labor's documentation of age discrimina-
tion as similar to sex and race discrimination.29 Further, no major problems
had arisen in Title VII's attempt to eliminate sex and race discrimination. It
was only natural, then, that this type of discrimination should be similarly
treated, even if the treatment was in a separate statute.
While the Acts do parallel each other, there are differences. The defenses
allowed under the ADEA, for example, are different from those recognized
under Title VII. The ADEA permits the defenses of good cause,3" differentia-
tion based on reasonable factors other than age, 3' use of age where age is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal opera-
tion of the particular business,32 and observance of any bona fide seniority
system or employee benefit plan which is not a subterfuge to evade the pur-
poses of the Act.33 It is this last defense which precipitates the inconsistent treat-
ment of the pre-seventy employee.
IV. MANDATORY RETIREMENT UNDER THE ADEA
Prior to the 1978 amendments to the ADEA, the Act prohibited man-
datory retirement of protected workers prior to age sixty-five unless pursuant
to a "bona fide seniority system or benefit plan." 3 The Act, however, did
not define this phrase and employers repeatedly raised the defense with vary-
ing results in the lower courts. In 1977 the Supreme Court squarely faced the
ADEA's bona fide seniority system or benefit plan defense in McMann v. United
Airlines." This decision, which set the 1978 amendment process in motion,
was preceded by the Secretary of Labor's indecision on the issue and by divergent
lower court opinions which created the need for the amendment.
A. The Need for the Amendment - Secretary of Labor Interpretations
In 1969 the Secretary of Labor concluded that the ADEA authorized in-
voluntary retirement irrespective of age as long as the retirement was pursuant
2
n fact Griggs, the disparate impact doctrine case (401 U.S. 424) was not decided until 1971.
29113 CONG. REC. 31,254 (1967).
"29 U.S.C. § 623(0(3) (1978).
29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1978).
3229 U.S.C. § 623()(1) (1978).
"29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1978).
"29 U.S.C. § 623()(2) (1978). "It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor
organization... (2) to observe the terms of... any bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement,
pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purpose of this chapter."
3"434 U.S. 192 (1977).
Summer, 19831
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to an otherwise bona fide section 623(0(2) retirement or pension plan.3" Whether
the retirement was mandated or optional was not determinative. The only re-
quirement was that the employee be a participant in the plan.
By 1975, however, the Secretary had modified his position. While not
changing the regulations, he intimated that only mandated or required
retirements under a plan would be lawful." If the retirement was optional with
the employer the plan could not withstand the ADEA age discrimination attack.
In fact, the Secretary's new position coincided with several key lower court
decisions38 including McMann. 39 The Secretary ultimately supported the analysis
McMann had urged in the Fourth Circuit under the bona fide plan defense,"'
a complete reversal of the Secretary's original conclusion that the United plan
did not appear to violate the Act.
B. ADEA Cases
1. Lower Court Decisions
McMann considered a pre-Act seniority system or benefit plan under the
ADEA.'I Harris McMann was hired by United Airlines, Inc. in 1944 and served
in various capacities before being mandatorily retired, over his objection, in
1973 just after his sixtieth birthday, pursuant to United's Employee Plan.' 2
The plan provided for a "normal retirement age" of sixty for employees in
McMann's classification. 43 Despite the Secretary of Labor's opinion stating
that United's plan did not appear to be a subterfuge to avoid the purposes
of the Act, McMann sought injunctive relief, reinstatement, and back pay
in the district court under the ADEA. The issue which the district court con-
sidered was whether the ADEA proscribed mandatory retirement prior to age
sixty-five if it was pursuant to a bona fide seniority system or benefit plan which
3629 CFR 860 110(a) 34 FR 9709, June 21, 1969.
"7DEPT. OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT ON ACTIVITIES UNDER THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT AcT,
at 17 (1975).
"See cases cited supra note 10.
39542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
10542 F.2d at 219-220 n.4.
"Id. at 218.
"Id. at 218-19.
"The court treated "normal" for these purposes as compulsory; the issue addressed, therefore, was whether
a compulsory pre-Act plan retirement violated the Act. Id. at 219 n.2. ".. . we conclude that for purposes
of this decision, the plan should be regarded as one requiring retirement at age 60 rather than one permitting
it at the option of the employer." Id. at 218 n.2.
"Id. at 210 n.4.
United draws our attention to the Secretary of Labor's regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 860.110, which
states that "the Act authorizes involuntary retirement irrespective of age." By its terms, this regulation
is interpretive, not legislative. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.1 (views subject to change in light of court decisions
or reexamination by Department of Labor). As evidenced by the Secretary's amicus curiae brief
and argument, he has now concluded that the statement in the regulations is erroneous. As we
understand the Secretary's present position, it is substantially in accord with the result we reach
here. Thus, the regulation has no significance for our decision. We express no opinion as to whether
it may provide the basis of a defense under 29 U.S.C. §§ 259, 626(e).
[Vol. 17:1
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preceded the effective date of the Act. 5
In defending its plan, United relied on Brennan v. Taft,"6 a case in which
the Fifth Circuit had concluded that pre-sixty-five retirement required by a plan
predating the Act was valid, since such a plan could never be a subterfuge."7
In Brennan, an employee of Taft Broadcasting Company was mandatorily
retired at the age of sixty pursuant to Taft's "Profit Sharing Retirement Plan.'"'"
The Secretary of Labor brought suit alleging that Taft's plan violated the
ADEA.' 9 While the Secretary's position turned on a narrow definition of bona
fide seniority or benefit plan and Taft's failure to communicate the terms of
the plan to the employee,50 the district court dismissed the action relying on
section 623(f)(2).15 The Fifth Circuit affirmed,52 stating that "Taft's 'plan' was
effectuated far in advance of the enactment of the law, eliminating any notion
that it was adopted as a subterfuge for evasion.""
Consistent with the conclusion in Brennan, the district court in McMann
concluded that any action required by a plan which pre-dated the effective date
of the Act could not be a subterfuge to violate the Act.5 ' The McMann court
applied the Act's bona fide seniority system or benefit plan exception 5 and
Brennan to grant summary judgment to United.
On appeal, buttressed by the Secretary of Labor's new position in its amicus
brief in support of McMann,56 the Fourth Circuit reversed.57 While conceding
that the plan was "bona fide" in that it existed and paid benefits, the court
rejected Brennan's subterfuge analysis, 8 and required United to show that the
mandatory retirement provision of the plan had some economic or business
purpose other than arbitrary age discrimination.I United had to show not only
that the plan was not adopted as a subterfuge, but also that it was not main-
tained as a subterfuge.6" Congress clearly would not have created so vast a
"Id. at 218.
"500 F.2d 212 (1974).
"Id. at 215. Also see infra text accompanying note 53.
"Id. at 214.
"Id. at 215.
1Id. at 216-217.
"Id. at 214.
52Id.
"1500 F.2d at 215.
"542 F.2d 218.
"Id.
"See supra text accompanying note 40.
"542 F.2d at 222 (1976).
"Id. at 220.
"Id. at 221. "... an early retirement provision must have some economic or business purpose other than
arbitrary age discrimination." Id.
"Ild. ". . . To avail himself of the exemption, an employer must demonstrate that a plan is not being
maintained as a subterfuge to evade the Act..." Id.
Summer, 19831
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loophole, the Fourth Circuit concluded. 6 Distinguishing between evading the
purposes of the Act as opposed to evading the Act, the Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that a seniority or employee benefit plan, effective long before the enact-
ment of the statute could, nevertheless, be a subterfuge to the purposes of the
Act.62
McMann was appealed to the Supreme Court, but before the Court could
reach a decision the Third Circuit had occasion to pass upon the subterfuge
issue in Zinger v. Blanchett63 Just prior to his sixty-fifth birthday, William F.
Zinger, an attorney in Penn Central Transportation's Legal department, was
mandatorily retired over his objection. 6 The retirement plan allowed the com-
pany to elect to retire any employee between the ages of sixty and sixty-five.65
Retirement payments for employees who retired at sixty-five were somewhat
larger than were those for pre-sixty-five retirees. 66 Zinger alleged that the in-
voluntary retirement violated the ADEA. The company argued that since the
retirement plan pre-dated the Act it could not be considered a subterfuge.67
Confronted by what it called "diametrically different interpretations" in
McMann and Brennan, the Third Circuit independently examined the Act and
its legislative history.66 It concluded that involuntary retirement pursuant to
a bona fide plan would not be a subterfuge, but that pre-Act plans are not
automatically exempted due to the fact that they were adopted prior to the
ADEA. 69 The Supreme Court then decided McMann.
2. The Supreme Court and McMann
The mandatory retirement of employees who participate in a bona fide
seniority system or benefit plan that so requires was approved by the Supreme
Court in McMann. The Court could find nothing to indicate that Congress
had intended wholesale invalidation of retirement plans initiated in good faith
prior to the effective date of the ADEA.7 It found the Fourth Circuit's distinc-
"Id. at 222.
6"Id. at 220. "What is forbidden is not a subterfuge to evade the Act, but a subterfuge to evade the purposes
of the Act..." Id.
63549 F.2d 901 (1977).
"Id. at 901-3.
6Id. at 902-3.
66Id. at 902. "Only months before his sixty-fifth birthday and despite his protests, the Penn Central
Transportation Company retired plaintiff Zinger, making him eligible for pension benefits from several
sources includding the Railroad Retirement Fund. However, these payments total $834.12 less per year
than he would have received had he continued to work for Penn Central until age 65." Id.
61d. at 904.
"Id. at 905.
6'Id. at 907.
7 The dissent relies heavily upon the legislative history, which by traditional canons of interpretation
is irrevelant to an unambiguous statute. However, in view of the recourse to the legislative history
we turn to that aspect to demonstrate the absence of an indication of congressional intent to
undermine the countless bona fide retirement plans existing in 1967 when the Act was passed. Such
a pervasive impact on bona fide existing plans shoulid not be read into the Act without a clear,
unambiguous expression in the statute.
434 U.S. at 199.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:1
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tion between the Act and the purposes of the Act untenable.7' The Court stated
" ... it is difficult to conceive of a subterfuge to evade the one which does
not also evade the other."7 Subterfuge, the Court concluded, meant a scheme
or plan or artifice of evasion.73 So read, a plan adopted prior to the effective
date of the Act could not be a subterfuge. Employers, then, need not show
a business necessity for the mandatory retirement as the Fourth Circuit had
required in McMann.7 4
In reaching its conclusion the Court looked to the legislative history of
the Act only to show the dissent's error." The Court stated that section 623(f)(2)
was only included to allow reduced benefits for older workers as an induce-
ment to employers to hire older workers." It was in no way directed to pro-
hibiting pre-sixty-five retirements pursuant to a bona fide plans. Accepting what
it described as the plain meaning of the statute, the Court adopted the Fifth
Circuit's interpretation and concluded that a pre-Act plan could not be a subter-
fuge of the Act.
Justice Marshall, in his dissent, maintained that an integrated reading of
the statute was necessary. He felt that the majority's interpretation of the ex-
ception would allow an employer to require an employee to retire before age
sixty-five while under another ADEA provision the employer would have to
rehire the same employee if the employee reapplied. 8 Clearly, he concluded,
Congress had not intended that result. Marshall also pointed out that section
703 of Title VII tracks the language of the ADEA's section 623(f)(2), and in
the absence of contrary Congressional intent should be construed similarly.79
Marshall, in essence, suggests Title VII as the starting point for ADEA analysis.
C. Title VII, A Starting Point for ADEA Analysis
The ADEA, while paralleling Title VII in condemning most stereotypes,
tries to find some middle ground that prohibits some stereotypes and allows
others.8 0 Unlike Title VII, the ADEA attempts to straddle the stereotype pro-
"Id. at 198.
"2Id.
""In ordinary parlance, and in dictionary definitions as well, a subterfuge is a scheme, plan, stratagem
or artifice of evasion. In the context of this statute 'subterfuge' must be given its ordinary meaning ... 
Id. at 203.
7s Any doubt as to the correctness of reading the Act to prohibit forced retirement is dispelled by
considering the anomaly that results from the Court's contrary interpretation. Under §§ 4(a) and
4(f)(2), see n.5, supra, it is unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire a job applicant under the
age of 65 because of his age. If, as the Court holds, involuntary retirement before age 65 is permissible
under § 4(0(2), the individual so retired has a simple route to regain his job: He need only reapply
for the vacancy created by his retirement. As a new applicant, the individual plainly cannot be
denied the job because of his age. And as someone with experience in performing the tasks of the
"vacant" job he once held, the individual likely will be better qualified than any other applicant.
Thus the individual retired one day would have to be hired the next. We should be loathe to attribute
to Congress an intention to produce such a bizarre result.
Id. at 217.
"Id. at 208-9.
"See Senator Yarborough's comments on the proposed act wherein he explained that § 623(0(2) would
prohibit discharge or refusal to hire based upon age but allow differential pension or retirement plans
Summer, 1983]
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blem. Its ultimate result is that one cannot use stereotypes for one purpose
but may use them for another. Not surprisingly, the Court is no more able
than Congress to eliminate the confusion. II While the Court may be criticized
for its McMann analysis, Congress is ultimately to be blamed for both giving
and takng away in the same move.
Congress' dilemma, however, is not unique. Social scientists themselves
offer us numerous definitions of ageism." They talk in terms of biological age 3
as opposed to psychological age, 4 and note that an individual may be a com-
posite of various ages at any one time, i.e., age of one's nervous system, age
measured by physical abilities or mental abilities etc. Not surprisingly, Con-
gress was not able to define the point at which it would want to prohibit all
of the stereotypes.
This confusion, however, may be inherent in the nature of age discrimina-
tion and the problems which ensue when any remedy is attempted. Most com-
mentators have concluded that employment discrimination laws will never com-
pletely eliminate employment discrimination.8" In theory, of course, even
marginally effective laws are better than none at all. But in actuality, discrimina-
tion laws often engender hostility against the protected minority when the
burdened majority feels adversely affected by the attempted remedy. Minority
group members in turn are all too aware of the laws' failures. The end result,
then, of the legislation is just the opposite of its stated objective.
While it certainly may be argued that no such result will occur in age
discrimination, that there is not and never will be such hositility between older
Americans as a class and younger Americans, and that the nature of the rela-
tionship is significantly different than, for example, the race problem, there
are nonetheless, too many similarities in the two situations to avoid comparison.
based upon age.
• . . [It] is basically my understanding of the provision in line 22, page 20 of the bill, clause 2,
subsection (f) of section 4, when it refers to retirement, pension, or insurance plan, it means that
a man who would not have been employed except for this law does not have to receive the benefits
of the plan. Say an applicant for employment is 55, comes in and seeks employment, and the company
has bargained for a plan with its labor union that provides that certain moneys will be put up for
a pension plan for anyone who worked for the employer for 20 years so that a 55-year-old employee
would not be employed past 10 years. This means he cannot be denied employment because he
is 55, but he will not be able to participate in that pension plan because unlike a man hired at 44,
he has no chance to earn 20 years retirement. In other words, this will not disrupt the bargained-
for pension plan. This will not deny an individual employment or prospective employment but will
limit his rights to obtain full consideration in the pension, retirement, or insurance plan.
113 CONG. REC. 31,255 (1967).
"See Justice Marshall's dissent in McMann, describing the confusion created by the majority's decision,
supra note 78.
1257 CHI[-]KENT L. REV. 833-50 (1981). 57 CHI[-]KENT L. REV. 895-903 (1981).
"See supra note 18.
"See supra note 19.
"See D. BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW; Chapter 9 The Limited Strategy of Fair Employ-
ment Laws (1980), See also, SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINT ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
(1966) and WINTER, Improving the Economic Status of Negroes Through Laws Against Discrimination:
A Reply to Professor Sovern," U. CHI. L. REV. 817 (1967).
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It is difficult to imagine that age discrimination will be totally eliminated.
The thirteenth amendment reinforces our nation's adamant policy against race
discrimination. 6 The repeated introduction of the ERA at least suggests that
sex discrimination will not be tolerated.87 Age discrimination has no such
vehicles. 88
In fact it might be argued that an age-based classification is far different
from one based on either race or sex. Aging happens to all individuals who
are lucky or unlucky to live long enough. This may explain our schizophrenia
on age stereotypes. Do we in fact find "benign" age-based stereotypes more
plausible because each of us stands eventually to benefit? Do we find
discriminatory stereotypes less repulsive because we are, or have been,
beneficiaries?
It may be argued that the Court has realized Congress' indecision and is
to be applauded for refusing to apply Title VII disparate impact analysis in
age discrimination cases.89 But the Court actually applied Title VII analysis
in McMann. It applied Title VII disparate treatment analysis because it found
the seniority defense an insurmountable stumbling block."0 Title VII, then, is
an appropriate starting point for a resolution of the appropriate standard for
ADEA analysis.
V. TITLE VII, THE ADEA AND DISPARATE TREATMENT vs. DISPARATE IMPACT
Two distinct theories of employment discrimination have developed under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Disparate treatment challenges inten-
tional discrimination whereas disparate impact challenges neutral employer
policies or actions which have an adverse effect on protected class members. 9'
A. Disparate Treatment
An employee who charges disparate treatment in violation of Title VII
has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. This burden requires
"U.S. CONST. amend XIII.
"At least that is one of the arguments in support of ratification of The Equal Rights Amendment to the
United States Constitution. See Kanowitz, The ERA: The Task Ahead, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L. 0. 637
(1979); Brown, Emerson, Falk and Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for
Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971).
"It is also difficult to imagine that race and sex discrimination will be totally eliminated, but it may be
argued that the national policy against race and sex discrimination is stronger. However, the ERA has
not been ratified and its effect as a statement of national policy is therefore very weak. Age discrimination,
similarly, has no constitutionally enunciated national policy. It should therefore be treated in the same
manner as sex discrimination. The courts have applied disparate impact analysis to Title VII gender
discrimination cases. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
'See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, __ U.S. ___, 102 S. Ct. 1534 (1982), wherein the Court
required an intention to discriminate before it would strike a bona fide seniority system even under Title VII.
"The Court, therefore, did not go any further and never concluded whether this would also withstand
disparate impact analysis.
""Protected class members" refers to those persons for whom the statute provides protection. Here it
refers-to employees beteween the ages of 40 and 70.
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proof of the employer's discriminatory motive or intent. 92 In McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green93 the Supreme Court articulated the required proof for a prima
facie case of Title VII disparate treatment race discrimination. The plaintiff
must show:
(i) that he [the complainant] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after
his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants from persons of Complainant's qualifications. 9'
Once the employee establishes a prima facie case the burden of produc-
tion then shifts to the employer to show a legitimate non-discriminatory reason
for its actions.95 If the employer does present a legitimate non-discriminatory
reason, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's
stated reason was pretextual.96
Disparate treatment analysis has been applied in ADEA cases when
employers paid workers different benefits based on age,97 or differentially
disciplined workers based on age,98 or terminations because of economic fac-
tors related to age. 99 While several courts applied Title VII's disparate treat-
ment analysis to ADEA cases, 10 the Second Circuit was the first to use Title
VII's disparate impact analysis in the ADEA case.' 01
B. Disparate Impact
In disparate impact cases under Title VII the employee usually presents
statistics showing a disparity in hiring or other policies which suggest that a
facially neutral employer policy has a discriminatory effect on protected class
members. 102 This showing satisfies the employee's initial burden and the burden
then shifts to the employer who must show a business need for the policy or
"See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-806 (1972), and SCHLEI & GROSSMAN.
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1154 (1976) and SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW, 1979 SUPPLEMENT 300-301 (1979), hereinafter SCHLEI & GROSSMAN.
93411 U.S. 792 (1972).
'Id.at p. 802.
""The burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for respondent's rejection." Id. at 802.
""The Court in McDonnell Douglas found the corporation's reason for rejection to be sufficient but stated
"On remand, respondent must, as the Court of Appeals recognized, be afforded a fair opportunity to
show that petitioner's stated reason for respondent's rejection was in fact pretextual." Id. at 804.
"Alford v. City of Lubbock, 664 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 102 S. Ct. 2239 (1982).
"Walker v. Pettit Constr. Co., 605 F.2d 128, (4th Cir. 1979).
""Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, 454 F.Supp. 15, aff'd in part, rev'd in part mem., 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir.
1979).
" See generally Player, supra note 13.
"'But the Supreme Court has not yet spoken on this issue and denied certiorari in Geller noting it had
never held disparate impact alone could violate the ADEA. 452 U.S. 945 (1981).
"'See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 92 at 1154.
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actions. "3 The Supreme Court adopted this approach in Griggs v. Duke
Power,1 0 4 stressing Congress' intent to remove "artificial, arbitrary, and un-
necessary barriers to employment" for protected class members."'
In Geller v. Markham, ' 0, the Second Circuit struck down a school board
policy which allowed preferential hiring of teachers with less than five years
of experience because of the policy's disparate impact on protected class
workers."0 7 The Eleventh Circuit similarly applied disparate impact analysis
to a reduction in force where the employer allowed managers to use whatever
criteria they chose to reduce the work force. The manager felt he could do
without several employees, but his choice had a disproportionate impact on
protected class members. 10 In 1983 the Eighth Circuit also adopted disparate
impact in ADEA cases. 0 9
The Supreme Court decided McMann under traditional Title VII
discriminatory treatment analysis. The imposition of age-based retirement,
however, has a disparate impact on older workers. Disparate impact, not
disparate treatment analysis would therefore have produced the correct result.
The Supreme Court, however, never reached the question of whether
disparate impact analysis was appropriate in McMann because the Court felt
circumscribed by the bona fide seniority system or benefit plan defense. The
Court concluded that be definintion section 623(f)(2) allowed all pre-Act plans
even though they provided for involuntary retirement.I10 The Court could not
find a subjective motive in conduct which preceded the enactment of the
statute.'I All pre-Act plans, therefore, survived disparate treatment analysis
as there was no discriminatory intent or motive. The Court did not consider
whether, lacking a discriminatory intent, a pre-Act plan might still violate the
ADEA.
C. The Better McMann Analysis
The Supreme Court adopted Title VII disparate impact analysis to remove
artificial, arbitrary impediments to employment of protected class members.
1 2
.'See Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
1*4ld.
"Id. at 429-31.
0635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980, cert. denied 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
,O7Id.
"*'Allison v. Western Union, 680 F.2d 1318 (lth Cir. 1981).
"'Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983).
""[A] plan established in 1941, if bona fide, as is conceded here, cannot be a subterfuge to evade
an Act passed 26 years later. To spell out an intent in 1941 to evade a statutory requirement not enacted
until 1967 attributes, at the very least, a remarkable prescience to the employer. We reject any such per
se rule requiring an employer to show an economic or business purpose in order to satisfy the subterfuge
language of the Act." United Airlines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 203 (1977).
'"Id.
"401 U.S. at 430-31.
In short, the Act does not command that any person be hired simply because he was formerly the
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In Griggs the impediment was a high school diploma or required test score.II3
McMann 's impediment was an involuntary retirement plan. The pre-Act plan
is an artificial, arbitrary impediment to employment of protected class members.
It should have been stricken under disparate impact analysis. Griggs focused
on whether the neutral policy or act operated to freeze prior employment prac-
tices which are now unlawful.'" The McMann court, if it had used Title VII
disparate impact analysis, would have similarly focused its attention.
Viewed in this light the plan must fail. It operated to freeze the prior lawful
employment practice of involuntarily retiring employees before age sixty-five.
Insulated by the plan defense," 5 the employer would have been allowed to con-
tinue to violate the law by involuntarily retiring pre-sixty-five employees in viola-
tion of the current law.
It is important to note that even though the pre-Act plan violated current
law, the section 623(f)(2) defense operated to make the plan neutral by
definition. ' 16 Any bona fide plan was devoid of an intent to discriminate by
virtue of the defense. The question was whether the plan could be called bona
fide. Although the Court correctly concluded a pre-Act plan was void of
discriminatory intent, the inquiry then should have focused on impact
discrimination. Did the plan have the unintended impact of discriminating
against protected class members?
The Supreme Court's McMann analysis simply did not go far enough.
It did not look to Title VII's other test (disparate impact). The McMann benefit
plan clearly operated to freeze the prior employment practice (involuntary pre-
sixty-five retirement), now unlawful.
The use of a separate statute to eliminate age discrimination has encouraged
distinctions in analysis based on the differences in the nature of age discrimina-
tion and race discrimination. Commentators suggest that Griggs' impact analysis
is inappropriate because there is nothing inherent in race or sex which sup-
subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority group. Discriminatory preferencefor any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed. Whatis required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment
when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification.
Id.
Il Id. at 427-428.
11 The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute.
It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated
in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees. Under the Act,practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot
be maintained if they operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.
401 U.S. at 429-30.
1"The plan defense was that the seniority or benefit plan pre-dated the Act and was, by definition, not
a subterfuge to evade the Act.
"'There could be no intent to discriminate because implementation of the plan pre-dated the Act. Once
could not intend to violate an act that was not even contemplated.
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ports a correlation between these characteristics and the ability to perform par-
ticular skills." 7 It has also been suggested that there is no history of lifelong
discrimination against individuals based on age as there is against individuals
based on sex and race." 8 These two differences, the theory continues, support
a conclusion that discriminatory impact analysis should be available under Title
VII but not under the ADEA."19
Other commentators suggest that there actually is a correlation between
age and the ability to perform certain jobs and that in order to find discrimina-
tion on the basis of age there must in fact be an intent on the part of the employer
to discriminate on the basis of age.'2 These commentators find support in the
notion that, with age, unlike race, there are no invidious stereotypes or hatreds
against those who are the subjects of the discrimination. '2' But should the dif-
ference in analysis turn on the length of time of the discrimination or the depth
of enmity against the protected class? It should not. An employer who prac-
tices discrimination against employees for twenty years rather than for the en-
tire forty or fifty years of their employment should not be protected simply
because s/he has been selective in terms of when s/he discriminated. Likewise,
an employer under Titlve VII is not protected simply because there was a time
when s/he did not discriminate against the protected employee. All unlawful
discrimination treats the individual unfairly based on a pre-conceived notion
of that individual's ability due to a characteristic which does not accurately
measure ability. Age, like race and sex, should be subject to disparate impact
analysis. There is no special reason to remove arbitrary discrimination from
race that is not there for age.' 22 Once we have identified the protected class,
"In fact it has been argued that there may indeed be such a correlation in regard to age, particularly
where manual labor is concerned. See Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90
HARV. L. REV. 380 (1976); Kovarsky & Kovarsky, Economic, Medical and Legal Aspects of the Age
Discrimination Laws in Employment, 27 VAND. L. REV. (1974).
1'In fact the Supreme Court notes in Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 208 (1976)
(per curiam) that age is really a stage in life rather than a class of people against whom invidious
discrimination is practiced.
"'See supra note 25.
'"See supra note 117. If the A.D.E.A. recognizes a correlation between age and performance, it recognizes
a lack of correlation up to the point for the protected ages. Between the ages of 40 and 70 the A.D.E.A.
does not recognize a correlation between age and performance.
The class defined by the statute is older workers, and once defined it is entitled to be free of
discriminatory treatment. It is similarly no answer to discrimination against women to say that they benefitted
from protective legislation in the past.
Further, while Murgia, 427 U.S. at 208, is authority for the proposition that there is more invidious
discrimination against parties based upon race and religion, the argument is weakened by the fact that
sex discrimination also uses impact analysis and sex discrimination was added to kill Title VIL. Clearly
Congress had no specific intent to afford this special protection to women, but the Court nonetheless
extended it to women just because sex happened to be tacked on as a protected class under Title VII;
but for the wheels of Congress, so too would the aged. Clearly this cannot be seen as an overriding reason
to exclude impact discrimination from the ADEA.
Persons between 40 and 70, in fact, are protected by the Act and as protected class members the
Act recognizes no correlation between age and their performance.
"'See Note, supra note 25 at 852.
"2It has been argued that if there is a policy of preferring younger workers it is somehow validated by
the fact that the older worker was at one time younger and might well have benefitted from the preference.
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discrimination is discrimination.'23 In an attempt to define some discrimina-
tion as worse than other discrimination, we show the sheer fallacy of the
distinction.
If X applies to an employer for a job and is black, if s/he is refused the
job because s/he does not have a high school diploma, s/he may sue on the
basis of the discriminatory impact of the requirement on blacks generally.' 24
If X had been a sixty year old white man, and the employer's policy had been
to not promote anyone with thirty or more years of experience, the court would
require X to find a discriminatory intent in order to sue the employer.
Discriminatory impact alone would not suffice. X at sixty would suffer just
as obviously from the "neutral" thirty year policy as X, a black person, would
suffer from the "neutral" policy of requiring a high school diploma.'25
Perhaps it could be argued that there is something different about race
discrimination, but sex discrimination cases also use disparate impact analysis
and the argument regarding the long history is much weaker there.'26 Disparate
impact should be available to eliminate arbitrary barriers which have no bear-
ing upon job performance and which result in excluding protected class
members. Once we define the protected class we should protect the class.
Disparate impact analysis protects the class from facially neutral policies that
unfairly set up barriers for protected class members. Disparate impact analysis
should be available for age discrimination.
The disparate impact test articulated by the Court in Griggs proscribes
not only overt discrimination but also prohibits practices that are fair in form
but discriminatory in operation. Seniority systems and benefit plans constitute
proscribed age discrimination when they impose a burden on older workers
This ignores the fact that sex uses disparate impact analysis and women have clearly benefitted from
ameliorative discrimination and suffered from invidious discrimination, yet the courts attempt to remove
arbitrary barriers.
Griggs' logic and holding were applied 6 years later in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977),
a gender discrimination case.
...The Griggs court expressed its concern about artificial barriers to employment. Clearly the use of age
as a limiting factor in employment is just that kind of arbitrary barrier. In fact it has been argued that
the sole purpose of the ADEA is to eliminate arbitrary barriers. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment:
Hearings on §§ 830 and 788 Before the Sub-Comm. of Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare (hereinafter cited as Hearings) 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1967) (statement of Secretary of Labor
Wirtz).
Once Griggs formulated the disparate impact doctrine, subsequent plaintiffs did not need to prove
that the underlying rationale applied in their individual case. Similarly, once the disparate impact doctrine
is applied to ADEA cases, a court need not determine whether the rationale applies to each case.
"See 401 U.S. 424.
"'See Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
" invidious discrimination against older workers as indicated by past discrimination can be found once
we define the protected class as those between 40 and 70. The use of the Griggs test requirement really
served as the arbitrary barrier, not the inferior education. Neither the education nor the test was necessary
to the job, as the Griggs court states. The barrier, then, was arbitrary. These arbitrary barriers are exactly
what the ADEA was intended to eliminate. It is a reincarnation of past discrimination against the protected
class when we discriminate against older workers due to our history of being allowed to so do. See also
Rutherglen, Sexual Equality in Fringe-Benefit Plans, 65 VA. L. REV. 199 (1979).
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in their status as employees by involuntary loss of their jobs. An employer should
be foreclosed from so burdening protected class members because of their age.
In 1978 Congress removed impact analysis as an issue for mandatory retire-
ment in its ADEA Amendments. But the amendment leaves questions
unanswered for the forty to seventy year old employee.
VI. AFTERMATH OF MCMANN
A. The Amendment
1. Purpose
The Conference Report indicates that the amendment to the benefit plan
exception was necessary to correct McMann's interpretation.' 27 The legislative
history accompanying the amendment finally clarifies the purpose of section
623(f)(2)'s exception. The amendment "served to express congressional approval
of the result reached by the Fourth Circuit in McMann," states the Senate
Report.'28 The intent, then, was to proscribe involuntary retirement of pro-
tected class members even if pursuant to a seniority system or benefit plan.
While Congress' intent is now clear, the effect of such an amendment was strong-
ly debated before enactment.
a. Proponents of the Bill
Armed with compilations of employers who mandatorily retire workers,
Harriet Miller, the Executive Director of the American Association of Retired
Persons, testified before the House Select Committee on Aging in favor of the
bill.' 29 She suggested that mandatory retirement ages are arbitrary and are a
substitute for good personnel policies. Further, employers often retire older
workers to cut their costs by hiring younger workers at lower wages.
Other proponents suggested that a mandatory retirement age was merely
an administrative convenience and that much of the concern about displacing
younger workers would be inapposite in view of declines in American
birthrates. 130
Medical authorities suggested that declines in physical and psychological
health often accompany the kind of enforced idleness that mandatory retire-
ment causes. ' ,
b. Arguments Against the Amendment
Opponents of the bill suggested that the problems facing older workers
1'1H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978).
'ld.
"2'Hearings at 1-5.
"'Id. at 56-60.
"'See Hearings at 4 (testimony of Dr. Robert Gunn).
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were much broader than mandatory retirement. '32 Congress, they suggested,
should look at the demographic effects of the proscription. Possible reduced
benefits to all workers was seen as a potential result. Correction of the short-
falls of Medicare and Social Security in meeting financial needs of older
Americans, they argued, would more effectively address the problem.'
33
Many older persons, opponents argued, really want to retire. Modifying
the statute would only cause additional confusion for them. Further the amend-
ment would disrupt many very effective retirement systems. If employers were
forced to discharge persons based on ability alone it would clearly discriminate
against the manual labor wage earner because physical abilities may decline
faster with age and managers who rely on cerebral skills would not be required
to retire as early as manual laborers. '
Concerns about the lack of jobs for youths, women and minorities were
also raised as a potential result of removing involuntary retirement. 135 In short,
opponents argued that the solution is income for older workers, not a longer
work life.
On balance Congress was persuaded that the amendment was necessary
and enacted the 1978 amendments to the ADEA.
2. Provisions of the Amendment
Section 623(f)(2) now provides that no bona fide seniority system or benefit
plan ". . . shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual
...because of the age of such individual."'
13 6
The 1978 amendment clarified the ADEA's seniority system or benefit plan
defense. The statutory defense does not protect involuntary retirement of pro-
tected class members. It requires that protected class members be treated as
any other employee in any mandatory retirement action by employers. The
defense does allow reductions in benefits for older workers but his is in keep-
ing with the Act's purpose of promoting employment of older workers.' 37 The
defense thereby encourages employers who hire older employees.
Employers with collective bargaining agreements presently in effect were
given time to come into compliance with the amendment as Congress felt that
many had in good faith entered into plans which were now clearly unlawful.
'"11d. at 98-110.
133id.
1"4See Hearings at 64-71 (testimony of H. J. Lartigue of the Exxon Co., U.S.A.).
" Hearings at 5.
13629 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1978).
"3 When the ADEA was enacted in 1967 Senator Javits stated "... [A]n employer will not be compelled
under this section to afford to older workers exactly the same pension retirement, or insurance benefits
as he affords younger workers." 113 CONG. REC. 31,255 (1967) reprinted in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2213. But see the 1982 amendments to the ADEA. Pub. L. 97-248, § 116(a).
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These agreements had to comply by the earlier of the termination of the agree-
ment or January of 1980. 3 The effect of the new amendment was immediate
if an employer was initiating a plan. Remedies for violations of the amend-
ment are those set forth for other violations of the ADEA.' 39
B. The Effect of the Amendment
Clearly, the amendment responded to McMann. Congress overruled
McMann's conclusion that pre-Act benefit plans requiring involuntary retire-
ment under the age of sixty-five were bona fide by definition. The amendment
construes any plan which involuntarily retires protected class members as
unlawful. Use of a seniority system or benefit plan, even an otherwise bona
fide seniority system or benefit plan to involuntarily retire protected class
members with intent to discriminate on the basis of age violates not only the
purposes of the Act, but the Act itself. Use of a bona fide seniority system
or benefit plan to involuntarily retire protected class members without the in-
tent but with the impact of discrimination on the basis of age also violates the
Act. Disparate treatment and disparate impact analysis now both apply to such
retirements. Congress has declared its intolerance of any kind of age-based in-
voluntary retirement of protected class members.
While Congress rejected McMann's date of enactment as the determinant
of whether a plan was a subterfuge, it did not proscribe any non-subterfuge
discrimination other than involuntary retirement of protected class members. 140
Disparate treatment or disparate impact analysis are not relevant to any other
action against workers pursuant to a bona fide seniority system or benefit plan.
In amending the ADEA to require a review of pre-Act seniority plans,
Congress has not eliminated the Supreme Court's dilemma with regard to Griggs'
impact analysis under the ADEA. The McMann court applied discriminatory
treatment analysis because it equated subterfuge with intent. The 1978 amend-
ments remove the need to show intent to discriminate in involuntary retire-
ment of protected workers pursuant to seniority systems or benefit plans. The
1978 amendments, however, do not resolve whether discriminatory impact is
available in other than involuntary retirement situations.
In 1982 Congress once again amended the ADEA. Under this amendment
employers cannot provide different group health plans to employees between
"'Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978).
'See 29 U.S.C. § 623(b) (1978), which adapts the remedies of § 216 of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
'"See 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1978):
It shall not be unlawful... (2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona
fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge
to evade the purposes of this chapter, except that no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the
failure to hire any individual, and no such seniority system or employee benefit plan shall require
or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual specified by Section 63 1(a) of the Title because
of the age of such individual . . .
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the ages of 65 and 69.1,' This amendment again requires equal treatment for
protected class members and, as Title VII, prohibits discriminatory health
benefits for protected class members.'
4
1
While the 1977 Reorganization Plan No. 1 ," transferred the Secretary of
Labor's functions under the ADEA to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, (EEOC), the Secretary's regulations are still in effect.' Clearly,
the amendment overturned the Secretary's 1969 conclusion that pre-sixty-five
involuntary retirements are lawful. It also mooted the Secretary's distinction
between optional and mandatory involuntary retirements. The Secretary's posi-
tion in his Fifth Circuit amicus brief in McMann is consistent with the
amendment.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE LITIGATION
While impact analysis is an important addition to the ADEA arsenal, it
is not a cure-all. Even if the court allows disparate treatment analysis in ADEA
cases, the court has severely limited this analysis even in Title VII cases where
a seniority system is challenged. '4, The court has broadly construed the defini-
tion of seniority system under Title VII, and if the two acts are treated similar-
ly, we can expect the same construction under the ADEA.
The 1978 amendment addresses only the question of involuntary retire-
ment. Other actions pursuant to bona fide seniority or benefit plans are still
reviewed under disparate treatment analysis. A reorganization of a work force
which results in a disparate impact on older workers due to the terms of a seniori-
ty or benefit plan could be defended against an ADEA attack.
New decisions as to what terms to include in a seniority plan must reflect
the current law. An employer may not now develop a plan which discriminates
on the basis of age and use that plan as a defense in a lay-off or reorganization.'
The defense merely protects such actions where there is clearly no intent to
discriminate. Plans which require anything short of involuntary retirement are
lawful. An employer is precluded under the 1982 amendments from offering
different health benefits to older workers.
Impact analysis would make the plaintiff's burden easier under the ADEA
even in light of the Court's broadened definition of seniority system, by allowing
statistical evidence of a disparity between a neutral policy's effect on older
workers to carry plaintiff's initial burden.
'Pub. L. 97-248, § (116(a).
1,Ild.
1435 U.S.C. § 354 (Supp. III 1979).
1"See Patterson, __ U.S .... 102 S.Ct. 1524.
''Clearly any such decision would post-date the Act and would evidence an intent to evade the Act.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Congress amended the ADEA in April of 1978 to prohibit pre-seventy
involuntary retirement of workers covered under the Act. The amendment
affirmed the Fourth Circuit's opinion in McMann and resolved a conflict in
rulings among the circuits. The amendment also effectively overruled the
Supreme Court's McMann holding.
The Supreme Court should apply disparate impact analysis in McMann
type cases. Clearly involuntary retirement of protected class members, even
pursuant to a bona fide plan, has a disparate impact on those members.
The similarities in language and construction of the ADEA and Title VII
suggest that Title VII analysis is relevant to construction of identical ADEA
language. Title VII's impact discrimination is therefore relevant in construing
unintentional discrimination caused by neutral policies.
Since the 1978 amendment proscribes all involuntary pre-seventy
retirements, and the 1982 amendment prohibits all differentiations in health
benefits for the age sixty-five to sixty-nine employee, any seniority system group
health or benefit plan which so requires by definition intentionally discriminates.
Despite the historical difference between age and race discrimination all employer
actions should be subject to both discriminatory treatment and discriminatory
impact tests. The purposes of Title VII and the ADEA are too similar to be
ignored.
Summer, 19831
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